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- Abstract -   
 
This paper investigates the impact of product market competition (PMC) on private benefits 
of control (PBC).  We estimate PBC using the voting premium between shares with differential 
voting rights. We use two measures of the intensity of product market competition: an external 
competition measure based on industry-level import penetration, and an internal measure 
derived from domestic product market regulations. Using data for publicly-traded firms in 19 
countries for which information on dual class shares is available we find that PMC is strongly 
negatively correlated with PBC. The evidence indicates that the effect is particularly strong for 
firms in industries that are likely to be concentrated and in countries with poor legal 
environments. We further examine the channels through which PMC enhances governance. We 
find evidence indicating that improvements in the availability of industry information and the 
higher default probability associated with tougher competition are two important forces in 
reducing the estimated price gap between dual class shares. Using exchange rates and terms of 
trade as instruments for import penetration, we find that the link between competition in product 
markets and private benefits of control is not spurious. Overall, our results suggest that product 
market competition can help in curbing private benefits of control. 
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 “Monopoly is a great enemy to good management” 
 
 
Adam Smith (1776) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
A widespread view among most economists is that product market competition improves 
corporate governance. Yet, this disciplining force is often overlooked in the corporate governance 
literature.
1 A common argument in support of the idea that product market competition improves 
corporate governance is natural selection, as competition would drive out of the market 
persistently inefficient firms (Alchian (1950), Stigler (1958)). This threat, according to Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), is “probably the most powerful force towards economic efficiency in the 
world.” In contrast, the absence of competition implies weaker incentives, greater diversion of 
productive resources, and lower overall efficiency. As argued by Leibenstein (1966), these 
efficiency losses might be the real costs of monopolies.  
While this argument is appealing, it may be too simplistic as it does not really flesh out 
why agency costs are lower in competitive environments. In principle, the owners of monopoly 
firms have the same incentives to monitor and discipline insiders as shareholders in more 
competitive environments (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Thus, if ownership and control are 
separated and monitoring is identical in all firms, then all competitors incur equal agency costs. It 
follows that increasing the number of market participants should have no effect on the amount of 
resources that are diverted by insiders.  
Beyond the fear of failure associated to competition, the literature has identified another 
crucial difference between competitive and monopolistic industries, namely, the amount and 
quality of available information about the environment in which insiders operate. Improved 
information can potentially reduce agency costs by lowering monitoring costs and by allowing for 
                                                      
1 See the excellent surveys by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003). Two 
notable exceptions are Nickell (1996) and Dyck and Zingales (2004).   2
sharper relative performance evaluation (Holmstrom (1982), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Hart 
(1983)).
2 
The objective of this paper is to shed light into two questions. First, is there evidence that 
justifies the perception that product market competition can improve governance? Second, if 
product market competition affects governance, what are the channels through which competition 
operates? In particular, we are interested in investigating if increasing the number of competitors 
affects the quality of the available information for investors, or if, alternatively, it is the increased 
risk of failure that leads to lower waste by insiders. 
In this paper we measure governance using an estimate of private benefits of control 
(PBC), a commonly used measure of the quality of governance arrangements (Lease, McConnell 
and Mikkelson (1983), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Rydqvist (1987), Baclay and Holderness 
(1989), Zingales (1994, 1995), Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales (2004), Doidge (2004)). We 
estimate PBC using the voting premium between shares with differential voting rights.
3 The logic 
for using this approach is that if control is valuable beyond cash flows that are shared with 
minority investors, and if control is a function of the stipulated voting rights, then the premium 
between differential voting shares could be used to estimate PBC (Zingales (1995)).
4  
The private benefits of control that we have in mind relate to the ability of insiders to 
redirect firms’ resources to themselves through transfer pricing or outright theft (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)), or the ease with which controlling shareholders can use information about 
valuable investment projects to pursue them outside the firm (Dyck and Zingales (2004)).  
                                                      
2 The theoretical foundation for the link between PMC and governance is not easy to formalize (Scharfstein 
(1998), Holmstrom and Tirole (1989)). 
3 Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (1983), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Rydqvist (1987), Zingales 
(1994, 1995), Nenova (2003), and Doidge (2004). 
4 The value of a vote is also determined by the probability that a vote affects the outcome of control 
contests.  In the absence of adequate data to control for such probabilities, the bulk of the empirical analysis 
of this paper examines within firm changes in the voting premium, implicitly assuming that the probability 
of having a pivotal vote is held constant. We think that this assumption is reasonable since ownership rarely 
changes over time and because corporate control contests outside the US are infrequent.    3
 
While PBC could also represent “amenity” or “psychic” values (Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), Harris and Raviv (1988), Aghion and Bolton (1992)), we think that the large estimated 
differences in PBC across countries (Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales (2004), Doidge (2004)) 
are hard to rationalize by these arguments alone. Furthermore, PBC are correlated with weak 
investor protection regimes (La Porta et al. (1997), Nenova (2003), Doidge (2004)), concentrated 
ownership and underdeveloped capital markets (Dyck and Zingales (2004)).  
We use a panel of 554 listed firms in 19 countries to test for the impact of product market 
competition on PBC using two measures of competition: an external metric based on industry-
level import penetration
5, and an internal index that is derived from country-level product market 
regulations (PMR).
6  
Using these measures we initially assess the impact of product market competition 
relative to other determinants of PBC that have been previously identified in the literature, most 
of which are cross-country characteristics. We find that product market competition is strongly 
negatively correlated with the voting premium, our measure of PBC. An increase in import 
penetration by 5 percentage points relative to the industry average is correlated with a decline in 
the voting premium of 3.5 percentage points, or 10 percent of the mean voting premium. 
Similarly, reducing product market regulations by 0.2 percentage points –equivalent to moving 
from the levels of PMR in France to those in Italy–, would reduce PBC by 0.13 percentage points.  
                                                      
5 Import penetration is defined as the ratio of industry imports to production plus imports at the industry 
level using data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) for all available countries and industries in 
the 1990 to 2002 period. 
6 The measure for domestic competition is the Product Market Regulation (PMR) index from the OECD, 
which measures the degree to which governments promote or inhibit competition at the country-level 
(Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005)). The PMR index is only available for OECD countries for the years 
1998 and 2003.   4
We also find that the estimated PBC are lower for firms in countries with higher rule of 
law indices, but that the negative correlation between import penetration and PBC is significantly 
larger in countries with weaker rule of law environments. That the average PBC estimate is lower 
for firms in high rule of law countries is not surprising (Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales 
(2004), and Doidge (2004)), yet the fact that conditional on a weak legal environment, PMC is 
strongly correlated with lower PBC suggests that competition in the product market can 
potentially reduce insiders’ consumption of private benefits.  
To push the analysis further, instead on relying on cross country differences in PBC we 
exploit the panel dimension of our data. Using within firm variation, we find that competition is 
consistently negatively correlated with our measure of PBC, even after controlling for time-
invariant characteristics. 
Having shown that product market competition does indeed reduce the estimated private 
benefits of control, we use our panel setting to further investigate the specific channels that have 
been previously suggested in the literature as conducive to improved corporate governance as a 
function of PMC. In particular, we test for potential improvements in the quality of information 
with competition, and for improved incentives to perform as the probability of being driven out of 
the market goes up.  
To test for the information channel we create an industry homogeneity index as in Parrino 
(1997) that captures the average correlation of equity returns for firms within industries. We use 
this index as a proxy for the informational advantage of increasing the number of competitors 
from the perspective of non-controlling shareholders, and test if the impact of product market 
competition differs as a function of the homogeneity of industries. To test for the threat of 
business failure, we investigate the impact of product market competition for firms of different 
levels of profitability. We anticipate that the lower the initial profitability of a firm, the higher the 
subsequent impact of PMC on PBC.   5
 
Our results indicate that changes in product market competition, as measured by import 
penetration only affect the estimated private benefits of control for firms that operate in 
homogenous industries. In other words, import penetration does not affect the voting premium in 
industries with greater intra-industry heterogeneity. 
The evidence also suggests a large negative correlation between changes in import 
penetration and changes in PMC for less profitable firms, which is consistent with the idea that 
product market competition might induce complacent insiders to improve their performance.  
Additionally, we find that the impact of PMC on the voting premium tends to be 
economically and statistically more significant in highly concentrated industries and less 
important for non-manufacturing firms, which tend to be less prone to foreign competition. Firm 
size, asset intensity, market to book ratios and leverage do not seem to affect our results.  
Finally, to address potential endogeneity concerns, we follow Revenga (1992) and 
Bertrand (2004) and instrument for import penetration using exchange rates and terms of trade, 
both of which are naturally correlated with import penetration but uncorrelated with the error in 
the measure of private benefits of control. Using instrumental variables, we confirm that PBC are 
negatively correlated with import penetration.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data on dual-class 
share firms and the measures of product market competition used in this paper. Section III, 
explains our empirical strategy for testing both the potential impact of product market 
competition on PBC and for assessing specific channels through which competition might affect 
governance outcomes. Section IV presents the results and discusses the interpretations of our 
findings, and Section V concludes. 
   6
II.  Data 
 
II. A. Dual share firms and estimate of private benefits of control (PBC) 
 
The information for firms with dual shares used in this paper comes from two sources. 
We start with all firms reported by Doidge (2004) to have dual-class shares in Datastream during 
1994 and 2001. To be included in the sample, Doidge (2004) requires that: (1) firms have at least 
two types of shares with differential voting rights, (2) that both share classes are publicly traded 
and listed on the domestic exchange, (3) the low voting class is not convertible to the high class 
and that (4) neither share receives a fixed dividend independent of the other class. Doidge (2004) 
also provides detailed information on the voting rights for each class of shares. 
We then supplement these data with all firms in Compustat Global for which two or more 
publicly-traded securities were identified. Compustat Global provides both a firm and a security 
code, which eases the detection of firms with at least two securities. Compustat Global allows us 
to increase the number of firms with dual class shares and in particular it allows us to identify a 
number of firms from the United States, which by construction were not collected by Doidge 
(2004). To make both samples consistent in terms of the requirements described in the paragraph 
above, we performed web searches and consulted Mergent Online. For U.S. firms we also used 
information from the Securities and Exchange Commission Edgar online dataset. 
Given that our objective is to estimate the voting premium between high and low-voting 
shares based on security prices, we obtain daily closing price information from Datastream. To be 
included in the sample we require firms to have security price information for both shares for at 
least 40 days per year. In order to minimize the impact of outliers, we restrict our attention to 
securities with trading prices of at least one unit of the local currency and we winsorize the data at 
the 1 and 99 percentiles of the distribution. After imposing all these sample restrictions we have 
749 firms in 23 countries, 694 of which are from Doidge (2004).    7
Following Zingales (1995) and Doidge (2004) we compute the voting premium as the 








=             (1) 
Where  H P  is the price of a high voting right share,  L P  is the price of a low voting right share and 
rv is the relative number of votes of the low voting rights share compared to the high voting 
share. In Table II, Column II we report the country averages for (1). Given that the bulk of the 
firms in this sample are from Doidge (2004), we also report in Column III the mean PBC as 
reported in Table 2 of that paper. Not surprisingly, the correlation between the two estimates of 
PBC is very high (0.82). 
 
II. B. Measures of Product Market Competition 
 
Given that our objective is to analyze the impact of product market competition on the 
voting premium, we identify two measures that can potentially capture its intensity: the level of 
import penetration and the index of product market regulation from the OECD. Import 









=          (2) 
Where  sct IP  is the import penetration ratio for industry s in country c at time t. Given that 
import penetration is at least partially determined by industry characteristics, we also compute 
industry adjusted import penetration (IAIP) ratios using the average import penetration for a 
given industry for all countries and years with import and production data. 
We construct  sct IP and  sct IAIP  using imports and production information from two 
sources: (1) the Structural Analysis Database (STAN) from the OECD, which is available through 
Source OECD online, and (2) the Industrial Demand-Supply Balance Database, from UNIDO,   8
which is available on CD-ROM. The OECD reports imports and production data by country and 
industry (ISIC Rev. 3) for selected countries starting in 1970, and its coverage is improved 
starting 1980 or later if a given country joined the organization thereafter. The most current data 
is for 2002. For non-OECD countries we use information from UNIDO (ISIC Rev. 3), which 
reports production and imports information for selected manufacturing industries and countries in 
the 1990 to 2002 period.  
In order to match industry data to firms’ information, we used Worldscope, Mergent 
Online and web searches to obtain the relevant industry codes. Worldscope and Mergent Online 
provide industry classifications under the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) classification 
system. We convert import penetration ratios to three-digit SIC codes using concordance tables 
for all available countries and industries in the 1990 to 2002 period. 
The measure for domestic competition used in this paper is the product market regulation 
(PMR) index from the OECD (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005)). The PMR index is an 
internationally comparable measure of the degree to which policies promote or inhibit 
competition in areas of the product market. The index is calculated using formal regulations 
relating to the extent of state control of business activities, legal and administrative barriers to 
entrepreneurship and barriers to international trade and investment. In 1998 (2003), the index 
ranged from a high 3.91 (2.76) in Poland to a low of 1.15 (0.92) for the United Kingdom.  
In order to relate our results to previous work in the financial development literature, we 
obtain a wide range of controls that seek to capture the role of local institutions and other country 
characteristics. These include, rule of law, accounting standards and anti-director rights from La 
Porta et al. (1998), as well as measures of tax compliance, newspaper circulation and quality of 
competition from Dyck and Zingales (2004).
7 Finally, we use information from the World 
                                                      
7 We have also assessed the impact of other country level variables such as French legal origin, religion, 
crime levels, cheating on taxes (La Porta et al (1998), Dyck and Zingales (2004)), and takeover regulations 
and charter provisions (Nenova (2003)). In all specifications these alternative controls do not affect our   9
Development Indicators dataset at the World Bank on indices of real effective exchange rates and 
terms of trade.
8 
Given that Datastream does not provide comprehensive coverage in terms of firm level 
income statement and balance sheet data, we use Worldscope and obtain information on sales, net 
income, assets, number of employees, total liabilities and market value. For US firms we use 
financial information data from Compustat Global. 
 
II. C. Summary Statistics 
 
Using information for firms for which the voting premium and at least one measure of 
product market competition is available, we arrive at 554 firms in 19 countries. The country-level 
summary statistics are presented in Table II, Columns IV to VIII. Relative to the total number of 
firms identified with dual class shares as reported in Column I, once we merge industry 
information, the sample is reduced. The most salient difference is Brazil, for which there is 
import penetration information for only 11 firms, relative to the 167 firms for which the voting 
premium can be estimated. Brazil accounts for 80 percent of the reduction in firms from Columns 
I to IV.  
The estimates of PBC are relatively consistent as we move from the entire set of firms to 
those with some information about the intensity of competition in product markets. The 
correlation of country-level averages of PBC between the two samples is 0.80. Two exceptions 
are Brazil, for which the estimated PBC goes from 16 percent in Column II to negative 3.6 in 
Column V and Switzerland for which it changes from 0.46 to 1.2.  
                                                                                                                                                              
results on product market competition, and these controls tend to be obscured by the measures discussed in 
the text. 
8 The real effective exchange rate index is defined as the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the 
value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or 
index of costs. The index of terms of trade is calculated using the ratio of export to import prices in a given 
country and year.   10
The low estimate of PBC for Brazil in our sample can be potentially attributed to the 
hypothesis anticipated in this paper, namely, that product market competition limits PBC, as the 
low level of PBC is matched with extremely large import penetration ratios.  
Overall, average import penetration by country reflects substantial competition from 
external markets. In the entire sample, average import penetration is 20 percent; and using equally 
weighted country averages it is equal to 24 percent, which ranges from the high 68 percent in 
Brazil to slightly less than 13 percent in Portugal and Norway. Note that these ratios are unlikely 
to be representative of the effective average import penetration in these countries as the 
information provided herein comes from industries for which firms with dual shares were 
identified, which are unlikely to occur randomly across industries. The correlation between 
country averages in IP and PBC is equivalent to -0.32. 
Column VII presents industry adjusted import penetrations (IAIP) which are arguably 
more informative about how intensive import competition is in a given local market. 
Interestingly, firms with dual-class shares are found in local industries that are, on average, less 
prone to competition from imports. The average sample IAIP is -0.06. Looking at specific 
countries, IAIP is particularly low for dual-class share firms in the United States (-0.14), Italy (-
0.14) and Korea (-0.13) and high for firms in Denmark (0.03), Austria (0.06) and Brazil (0.53). 
Also noteworthy, the correlation between IAIP and PBC is negative and large -0.42. 
Column VIII presents the OECD index of product market regulation (PMR) using 
country averages for the two years (1998 and 2003) for which this measure is available. The 
average PMR is 1.8 for all countries, ranging from a low 1.01 and 1.13 in the United Kingdom 
and Australia, respectively, to a high 3.1 for Turkey, 2.4 for Italy and 2.3 for Mexico. The 
correlation between country levels of PMR and measures of PBC is positive and large, and it is 
equal to 0.57.   11
As a preliminary assessment of whether our measures of the strength of product market 
competition can potentially add to our understanding of the determinants of PBC, we report the 
International Country Risk Agency’ rule of law index in Column IX. This index has been widely 
used in the financial development literature (La Porta et al. (1998)) and has been found to 
negatively correlate with PBC (Dyck and Zingales (2004)). As expected, rule of law is negatively 
correlated with PBC (the correlation is -0.05), yet this correlation is significantly low relative to 
those found between PBC and IAIP and PMR, respectively. 
 
III.  Empirical strategy 
 
III. A. Does product market competition (PMC) affect private benefits of control (PBC)? 
 
When trying to test for the impact of PMC on PBC, we need to overcome two major 
obstacles. First, finding reasonable measures for both PMC and PBC and second, finding a source 
of variation that allows us to identify if PMC directly affects PBC or if the estimated correlations, 
when present, are spurious. 
As discussed in the previous sections, we estimate PBC using the voting premium as it 
was defined in equation (1), and product market competition using two metrics: (a) the industry 
adjusted import penetration (IAIP) by country, industry and year, and (b) the OECD product 
market regulation (PMR) index (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005)). 
Using the voting premium to measure PBC comes with both advantages and 
disadvantages. It is appealing because it is based on security prices that reflect investors’ 
valuations for being in control, which are related to PBC. It is, therefore, a useful way in which 
phenomena that are usually private can be measured meaningfully. The voting premium approach 
is also attractive because changes in this variable do not reflect variations in firms’ cash flows as 
dual-class shares in this sample receive similar dividends. Third, it allows for the estimation of 
PBC for a given firm at different periods of time, allowing for panel data analysis.    12
 
A drawback of the dual shares methodology to estimate PBC is that, in contrast with 
other measures of PBC based on acquisitions of controlling interests (Barclay and Holderness 
(1989)), the measure of PBC is only available for those firms that have self-selected into the pool 
of firms with at least two classes of shares, a decision that is likely to be correlated with high PBC 
to begin with. Second, dual-class shares are not allowed in every country (ex. Japan), preventing 
us from estimating PBC in those settings. Third, it requires making some assumptions about the 
probability that a control contest occur in order to correctly estimate PBC (Zingales (1995)).  
In the absence of information on firms’ ownership structures and given our inability to 
control for the associated probabilities that firms might be taken over, in this paper we primarily 
rely on within firm variation in the voting premium. As such, we implicitly assume that the 
probability of having a pivotal vote is constant, which we think is a reasonable assumption since 
ownership rarely changes over time and because takeovers outside the US are infrequent. 
Measuring the degree of product market competition is also challenging.  
Industry adjusted import penetration by country, industry and year is an attractive 
measure of competition because it overcomes a common drawback of other proxies that solely 
vary across countries or industries. There are numerous institutional differences across countries 
that are difficult to adequately control for, leading to estimated coefficients that potentially reflect 
the effect of unobserved variables. It is, however, a market concentration index, and as such, it 
might not necessarily reflect lack of competition: industry concentration can arise even in 
competitive environments (Demsetz (1973)). To overcome these concerns, we focus on within 
IAIP variation and we revisit our results using instrumental variables. 
The OECD product market regulation index is appealing as a measure of PMC because it 
is not based on competitive outcomes, but rather it is constructed based on government 
regulations that are unlikely to reflect specific firm conditions. Its main disadvantage is that it   13
only varies by country and that it is only available for 1998 and 2003, which significantly limits 
our ability to use the indicators of PMR in the panel setting. 
With our measures of IAIP and PMR in hand, the source of variation in the regression 
framework we specify are changes over time in the degree of competition within an industry in a 
given country (IAIP) or within a country (PMR). Our aim is to test how private benefits of control 
change as our measures of competition increase. 
In order to facilitate the comparability of our work to previous studies that have analyzed 
the determinants of PBC in similar settings (Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales (2004) and 
Doidge (2004)), our initial specification analyzes the impact of increased product market 
competition in a specification where we can revisit the institutional determinants of PBC that do 
not vary within countries. Therefore, the basic specification we estimate is as follows:  
 
ijt s t c ist st ist d d W X Comp PBC ε ψ ϑ β α + + + + + + =
' '      (3) 
 
where  ist PBC  are private benefits of control for firm i,  in industry s, at time t  and 
st Comp  is the relevant measure of competition (results are shown with  st Comp  measured as 
IAIP and using the PMR index). 
'
ist X is a vector of firm specific controls and 
'
c W  a vector of the 
country characteristics studied in the literature. Since these controls vary only across countries it 
is not straightforward to interpret the coefficients as causal, because the potential for omitted 
variables is considerable. Time ( t d ) and industry ( s d ) dummies are included to control for 
aggregate time trends and industry specific invariant characteristics, respectively. If product 
market competition reduces PBC, we anticipate β  to be negative and significant when we use 
industry-adjusted import penetration, and positive and significant when we use the PMR index.   14
In order to address the limitations of relying only on cross-sectional variation, we then 
proceed to estimate our parameter of interest β  using changes in competition at the industry and 
country level. For this purpose we estimate the following specification with firm fixed effects: 
ijt t i ist st ist d d X Comp PBC ε ϑ β α + + + + + =
'     (4) 
In this setting, the time-invariant country and industry variables drop out and the 
variation identifying the β  coefficient comes from changes over time in the degree of 
competition faced by a firm in its own industry. The fixed effects specification accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level: any time-invariant characteristic (country, industry or 
firm specific) that is correlated with our measures of competition, would have biased the 
estimated coefficients in the cross sectional specification.  
It is worth noting that st Comp  is measured both with IAIP and the OECD PMR index. 
When using import penetration as a proxy for competition, interpreting our estimated β  as a 
causal parameter is not straightforward, as IAIP is itself an outcome measure of market conditions 
that is not necessarily exogenous in this setting.  In contrast, using changes in PBC based on 
changes in the OECD PMR index arguably reflects exogenous changes to PBC as PMR is 
determined by country-wide changes in government policies that affect product market 
competition and that are not specific to a given firm or industry. 
 
III. B. How does product market competition (PMC) affect PBC? 
 
Even if we establish a link between PMC and PBC (β ), we then face the challenge of 
explaining the specific channels through which it occurs. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
literature has identified two important channels through which PMC can affect insiders’ behavior. 
The first channel stresses the increased information associated with competition, which can lower 
monitoring costs and allow for improved relative performance evaluation (Holmstrom (1982), 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Hart (1983)). The second channel is related to the higher default   15
probability associated with stiffer competition, which increases the costs of managerial waste 




To measure the extent to which product market competition can convey relevant 
information to market participants, we follow Parrino (1997) in estimating an index of industry 
“homogeneity” based on the within industry correlation (at two digit SIC code-level) of stock 
returns with respect to an equally-weighted industry return index during the 1980 to 2003 period.
9 
As in Parrino (1997) we proceed as follows. (1) An equally-weighted (EW) return index is 
estimated for each industry using all firms with monthly returns on CRSP, (2) firms returns are 
regressed against the EW market return index and the industry return index, and (3) the partial 
correlation coefficient for the industry return index in this regression is averaged across all firms 
in each industry to obtain the homogeneity index.
10 
In using this index, we are implicitly assuming that within industry correlations found in 
the Unites States are representative of the real correlations that one would observe elsewhere. In 
other words, we are assuming that these correlations are driven by industry specific 
characteristics, an approach that resembles the empirical strategy of Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
The homogeneity index reflects the extent to which within industry equity prices 
fluctuate simultaneously and consequently it captures the degree to which shocks to an industry 
affect all firms at the same time. Therefore, we would expect that for highly homogenous 
industries, it is easier for shareholders to extract information from the interactions in the market 
place. These informed interactions can help outside investors learn about the true environment in 
                                                      
9 We estimate our own homogeneity index, as the index in Parrino (1997) does not report information for a 
significant number of firms in our sample.  
10 As in Parrino (1997) we restrict the number of firms that are used in the estimation to be in the 35 to 50 
range since the partial correlation coefficient from the two-factor model is negatively related to the number 
of firms used in the industry index   16
which firms operate, and then potentially allow them to act on this information to discipline 




We also use a measure of industry concentration to investigate if industries that share 
features of natural monopolies react differentially when confronted with competition. To assess 
this empirically, we use information from the Herfindahl indices at the 4-digit SIC industry-level 
from the US Census of Manufacturers for 1992. Presumably, changes in import competition 
could have differential effects in more concentrated industries.  
Given that both the homogeneity and concentration measures are treated as if they were 
dictated by technological parameters, the specification we estimate is: 
 
ijt t i st s st ist d d X Comp Tech Comp PBC ε ϑ φ β α + + + + + + =
'
ist *    (5) 
 
Where  s Tech  is a dummy that captures our “technological” parameters (homogeneity or 
concentration) and φ  identifies the differential effect of PMC across these variables. 
We are also interested in finding out if PBC of firms with higher probabilities of default 
change differently in the presence of competition. We capture this idea empirically by 
investigating if firms with higher profitability perform differently. To limit potential interactions 
between changes in PMC and profitability, we split firms in our sample into two groups based on 
their profitability in the first year they appeared in our panel.  
Finally, a number of specification checks are performed to assess if alternative firm 
characteristics affect the impact of product market competition on PBC, such as firm size, sales to 
asset intensity, market to book ratios, leverage, and whether firms belong to the manufacturing 
sector, where the disciplinary force of foreign competition is potentially stronger than in services. 
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III. C. Instrumental Variables 
 
The specifications in equations (4) and (5) control for firm unobserved heterogeneity 
bias, and exploit the variation in competition within industries and firms. However, one might 
argue that since the voting premium is the result of forward-looking stock prices, they should 
already capture any foreseen changes resulting from competition. In consequence, fixed effects 
estimates would be biased towards zero and the true effect of competition should be larger. 
Alternatively, the estimates from a panel setting might be confounded by reverse causation 
arguments. To overcome these criticisms, we instrument for import penetration using exchange 
rates and terms of trade, which are correlated with import penetration but uncorrelated with the 
error in the measure of private benefits of control.  
 
IV.  Results 
 
 
Table III.A presents the basic empirical relationship between our two measures of 
competition and the estimate of private benefits of control. When comparing firms according to 
how competitive their industries are (Rows A-D), there seems to be evidence that high import 
penetration environments are associated to lower estimated PBC. Interestingly, the bottom rows 
in Table III.A (E and F) highlight that the impact of product market competition on PBC might be 
symmetric, that is, low levels of product market regulation are correlated with low levels of PBC. 
The average voting premium in the data is 0.37 while the average import penetration is 
0.20. The negative correlation between import penetration and PBC is particularly clear when we 
either concentration on the top quartile of the sample in terms of import penetration (Row B) or 
when we use industry adjusted import penetration (Rows C and D), which as argued in previous 
sections, is more likely to capture the strength of product market competition. Average PBC in 
the top quartile of import penetration are equivalent to 0.26 relative to 0.40 for the rest of the   18
sample, a difference that is statistically significant at the 5-percent level. Splitting the sample in 
based on IAIP, yields similar results: the top 50-percent (25-percent) of firms based on IAIP have 
average PBC of 0.28 (0.16) relative to 0.45 (43.5) for other firms. Both differences are 
statistically different at conventional levels. These numbers indicate that the higher the industry 
adjusted import penetration, the lower the private benefits of control. 
Similarly, in the sample for which we have the OECD PMR index, the average voting 
premium is 0.44, but it is as high as 1.1 in the top quartile of regulated industries (less subject to 
competition), relative to 0.22 in the rest of the sample. The difference of 0.88 is statistically 
significant and it is twice as large as the average premium in the sample, suggesting that product 
market regulations can potentially lead to higher PBC.  
Table III.A. shows that regardless of which measure of competition we chose, namely 
“high” import penetration or “low” product market regulation, PBC are lower for firms in 
competitive environments. However, institutional differences across countries as well as 
differences in industry characteristics could be driving these differentials. We now proceed to 
address if these factors could account for this startling differences using IAIP and PMR as proxies 
for the strength of product market competition. 
Column I of Table IV shows the effect of import penetration on the voting premium in a 
simple OLS regression framework, controlling exclusively for aggregate time-trends. The effect 
at the mean is -0.73, such that a 5 percentage point increase in import penetration relative to the 
industry average would translate in a reduction in PBC of 3.5 percentage points, or around 10 
percent of the average PBC. This is significant at 1-percent level. 
Columns II to IV introduce a set of variables that have been shown to explain differences 
in PBC across countries. In Column II the following variables in La Porta et al. (1998) and Dyck 
and Zingales (2004) are included: rule of law, anti-director rights and accounting standards (see 
Table I for a detailed description of these variables). Rule of law has an economically large and   19
statistically significant effect on reducing PBC, even controlling for industry fixed effect. This 
result is consistent with the existing literature. The point estimate suggests that moving from the 
rule of law index of Italy to the level of rule of law in Germany would reduce PBC by an average 
of 0.10 points. The indices of anti-directors rights and accounting standards, do significantly 
affect PBC. The estimated coefficient on the effect of product market competition is not affected 
by the inclusion of these additional controls.  
Column III in Table IV introduces the main variables that Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
identify as significant determinants of PBC, namely newspaper circulation as proxy for the role of 
the media in limiting stealing, the level of tax compliance and a survey question relating to 
whether unfair competition is legally prevented. We find that PBC are significantly lower in 
countries where tax compliance is higher as well as in countries where competition laws are 
perceived as more developed. While the direction of these estimated coefficient is consistent with 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) our point estimates are larger which could be explained by the fact that 
they estimate PBC using control block sales. Interestingly, including their measure of competition 
does not eliminate the effect of import penetration: the estimated coefficient is now -0.98 and 
remains statistically significant at the 1-percent level. These results suggests, as expected, that 
competition is not a uni-dimensional variable and that it can affect PBC through different 
channels, in this case, through the quality of competition laws and the intensity of import 
penetration. One caveat, however, of the competition laws variable and other controls on Table 
IV is that they only have cross country variation, and therefore the room for omitted variable bias 
is considerable. This is minimized in our specification relative to the previously cited papers, to 
the extent that we also include industry dummies, and therefore the variation we are exploiting to 
identify these coefficients is the within industry variation across countries of the relevant 
explanatory variables.   20
Column IV shows that the effect of competition is stronger in countries with below 
average rule of law. This indicates that beyond the usefulness of regulation to curb PBC and 
improve governance, product market competition is an important mechanism to achieve the same 
goal, and that it is more effective in countries with weaker law and order tradition as measured by 
this variable. 
Finally, Column V uses the OECD product market regulation index. Since this is only 
available for two years (1998 and 2003), the effective sample drops substantially even though the 
sample is no longer restricted to industries for which information on import penetration was 
available. It is important to remember that this index only varies by country so we effectively 
have 32 observations that are identifying the effect of the PMR index (17 for 1998 and 15 for 
2003). In spite of the restrictive test, we find that firms in more highly regulated countries exhibit 
higher PBC. 
The results in Table IV show a relationship between competition and PBC over and 
above other characteristics of countries and industry controls. However, these specifications do 
not take into account the following potential concerns: countries differ in ways that may be 
correlated with our estimate of PBC, firms themselves might be different and their differences 
might be confounding our findings, and the sample composition may be changing over time. To 
address these issues we turn to our panel specifications that include firm fixed effects. 
The Column I in Table V yields a coefficient of -1.36 for the effect of industry adjusted 
import penetration on the voting premium. The coefficient is larger in absolute value than the one 
obtained in Table IV without controls for firm unobserved heterogeneity. It implies that a 5 
percent increase IAIP will result in a reduction of 7 percentage points in PBC.    21
Column VII in Table V uses the same specification for the measure of product market 
regulation. It confirms in the panel setting that as a country becomes less regulated, PBC fall. The 
size of the effect is not negligible: an increase in competition equivalent to going from the level 
of PMR in Italy to the level observed in France would lead to a reduction in PBC of 0.40. The 
limited variation of this variable does not allow us to saturate the model further. As a result, the 
rest of the results of this paper concentrate on investigating the link between import penetration 
and PBC. 
 
Why does product market competition matter? 
 
An important question is whether we can correctly interpret the effect of product market 
competition on PBC as a disciplining effect. If the role of product market competition is to 
discipline controlling shareholders that under-perform, then we would expect that the effect 
should be larger in firms that are hardly profitable to begin with, relative to other firms might not 
be as poorly run or for which the probability of going out of business is not a real concern. 
Column II shows the extent of the impact of competition on PBC as a function of the initial 
profitability of firms at the point in which they first appear in our sample. We find that PBC 
hardly change in initially profitable firms, and that the bulk of the reduction in PBC is explained 
by firms that have low profitability prior to the increases in import penetration. This result 
suggests that the notion that competition provides a disciplining effect to insiders through the 
probability of default faced by their firms is supported by the data. 
We further explore the specific channels through which the disciplinary effect of 
competition operates by investigating the differential effect that IAIP has on firms as a function of 
how homogenous or heterogeneous their industries are. Within industry homogeneity means that 
an equal increase in IAIP would reveal a lot more information about the true environment of firms 
to market participants relative to similar increases in IAIP for heterogeneous industries.    22
As a result, owners find it easier to benchmark firm performance against the information 
provided in the industry and they are more readily aware of the extent of the inefficiencies or 
fund diversion. In contrast, if competition does not convey valuable information, then we should 
not observe any difference between transparent relative to non-transparent industries.  
To investigate this empirically we use Parrino (1997) homogeneity index, which is 
explained in detail in section III. In a nutshell, it provides a technological parameter for the 
transparency of the sector as it is calculated based on the within industry correlation of equity 
returns. Column II in Table V shows that the effect of import competition is stronger in industries 
with high homogeneity, where shocks in one firm are more likely to reveal relevant industry 
information. In fact, when we split the firms of our sample based on this index, we find that for 
the group of firms in heterogeneous industries, where it is harder to benchmark outcomes against 
those of competitors, increases in competition have no effect on PBC. This result provides 
empirical support to the idea that increases in competition can provide greater levels of 
information, which can then limit private benefits of control. 
We test for an alternative technological variable that proxies the degree of economies of 
scale, namely the level of concentration of an industry in the U.S. High concentration industries 
in the U.S. –a country with arguably low institutional barriers to entry and at the edge of the 
technology frontier– reflect a large minimum efficient scale. It points to potential concentration in 
other countries and the likelihood that the sector tends towards a natural monopoly.  
By extension, an increase in import penetration should have a higher impact in industries 
with high potential concentration, where waste and discretion are potentially larger. This is 
exactly what we find: the effect of import competition is associated to significant declines in PBC 
in concentrated industries.    23
Column V incorporates the variables on initial profitability, homogeneity and 
concentration concurrently. The results are unchanged, except for the fact that the effect for 
highly concentrated industries disappears. The bulk of the bite of product market competition on 
PBC seems to occur in homogeneous industries with low initial profitability. For these industries, 
the coefficient on IAIP is -4.25, which is considerably larger than the average effect in the whole 
sample as documented in Column I. 
Column VI in Table V, introduces firm level controls for firm size (log of assets) and 
profitability (net income to assets) for those firms for which matching financial data from 
Worldscope was available. We find that PBC are larger in bigger firms and that the higher the net 
income in the panel setting, the lower the estimated PBC. The result is also consistent with the 
idea that firms with higher levels of net income –arguably the easiest measure of profits to 
contract upon– have fewer agency costs. 
Table VI runs a series of robustness checks to assess whether the effect of competition 
varies with firm characteristics that are commonly found in the literature to be important in an 
array of settings, such as, firm size, sales to assets intensity, market to book ratios and leverage. 
To test for the effect of these variables, we split the sample in two based on each variable and 
allow for an interaction with IAIP to differ accordingly. In all the regressions in Table VI we 
control for the industry homogeneity effect that we documented in Table V.  
These firm-level characteristics do not seem to be determining the impact of competition 
on PBC. The only significant interaction is for firms in manufacturing activities. Manufacturing 
firms are more responsive to increased import penetration relative to other firms, which seems 
natural given that services are arguably less exposed to effective direct competition from foreign 
entities through the import channel.   24
The previous results indicate that increased import competition reduces PBC, and this 
holds true controlling for firm fixed effects. The result is particularly strong in homogenous and 
concentrated industries and in low profitability firms. We have also shown that countries that 
deregulate their product markets observe significant declines in PBC. Moreover, the fact that the 
interaction between firm size and import penetration is not an important explanatory factor 
suggests that changes in the probability of control contests might not be driving our findings, 




Up to this point, we have not addressed the concern that that our dependent variable is 
based on equity prices, which should contain all relevant available information related to 
competition at the time prices they are set, which includes investors expectations on foreign 
competition. If this were the case, then our panel results would underestimate the actual effect of 
competition. Furthermore, if PBC are an indicator of how well firms are run and this in turn 
determines the extent of import penetration (badly run firms have higher costs and therefore 
foreign firms can increase entry into the market more easily), then interpreting the panel 
estimated coefficient becomes problematic. 
In order to address these issues, we instrument import penetration the indices of real 
exchange rates and the terms of trade from the World Bank. The idea is that changes in these 
instruments are unexpected shocks determined by macroeconomic conditions and exogenous to 
the firms in our sample. The second stage, therefore, estimates the effect of unexpected changes 
in competition, and gets around endogeneity concerns and the downward bias problem from 
perfect foresight of asset prices. Both the real effective exchange rate and the terms of trade 
variable contain information on price changes, but since these are not linearly related, including 
both measures yields a better fit in the first stage.   25
Table VII presents the results. As expected, the instrumental variables (IV) estimates are 
larger in absolute value in all regressions. If we concentrate on the panel IV estimates, the effect 
of import penetration first stage is most precise in the manufacturing regression (Columns V and 
VI). For this sub-sample we obtain a coefficient of -16.9, relative to -3 in the previous 
specifications earlier (the coefficient is -26 in the whole sample, but the first stage is extremely 
imprecise when we include non-manufacturing firms, leaving us potentially concerned about a 
weak instruments problem in that specification). In sum, instrumental variable estimates point to 
a causal effect of competition on private benefits of control, which is significantly larger than the 
estimated effect using within firm and cross-sectional specifications. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examined the impact of product market competition on private benefits 
of control estimated using the voting premium between shares with differential voting rights. To 
capture the strength of competition in the product market we used an external measure of 
competition based on industry-level import penetration, and an internal metric based on a 
country-level index of the degree of government regulation in product markets.  
We argued that this is a useful setting for testing the widespread belief that product 
market competition improves governance for the following reasons. First, there are few measures 
of governance arrangements that are as sharp as the value of private benefits of control as 
calculated using voting premiums. Second, existing evidence has found large differences in 
measures of private benefits across countries that have been explained as a function of the ability 
of insiders to divert firms’ resources away from minority investors (Nenova (2003), Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) and Doidge (2004)). Third, the strength of import penetration varies both across 
industries and in time, and it is prone to vary with currency fluctuations.   26
We documented a strong and robust negative correlation between our measures of 
product market competition and estimates of private benefits of control. Moreover, we showed 
that the impact of product market competition on voting premiums is particularly strong for firms 
in industries that are likely to be concentrated and in countries with poor legal environments (La 
Porta et al. (1998)).  
We then assessed if the specific channels that have been previously suggested in the 
theoretical literature as conducive to enhanced governance find support in the data. We found that 
improvements in the availability of industry information and the higher probability of default 
associated with stiffer competition are two important forces in reducing the estimated price gap 
between dual-class shares.  
Overall, our findings provide empirical support to the idea that product market 
competition can discipline insiders of publicly traded corporations. Furthermore, we think that the 
direct link between the intensity of product market competition and measures of the quality of 
corporate governance, financial development and economic growth is a fruitful research agenda. 
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TABLE I. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable Definition Source
Voting Premium Share price data from Datastream
P H is the price of a high voting right share, P Lis the price of a low voting right share
and rv is the relative number of votes of the two types of share
Industry-adjusted  Import penetration in a country, sector and year less the average import penetration  OECD Structural Analysis Database 
Import penetration (IAIP) for the relevant 3-digit industry. Import penetration is the ratio of the value of imports  UNIDO Industrial Demand-Supply Balance Database 
relative to the value of imports plus the value of local production at the 3-digit level
Product market regulation OECD index measuring the degree to which governments promote or inhibit  OECD Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005)
competition at the country-level, available for 1998 and 2003
Rule of law “Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country risk rating agency La Porta, et al. (1998), from: International Country Risk guide. 
International  Country Risk (ICR). Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index  Dyck and Zingales (2004)
between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero to ten with lower scores  for less tradition for law and order 
(we changed the scale from its original range going from zero to six).”  La Porta et al. (1998) 
Antidirector rights “An index aggregating shareholder rights formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders La Porta, et al. (1998) based on company law or commercial code
to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to  Dyck and Zingales (2004)
the general shareholder’s meeting, (3) cumulative voting  or proportional representation of minorities in
the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum 
percentage of share  capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholder’s 
meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have 
preemptive rights  that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from zero to six.” 
Accounting standards “Index created by examining and rating companies’ 990 annual reports ontheir inclusion or omission La Porta, et al.  (1998) 
of 90 items. These items fall into seven categories (general information, income statements, balance  from International Accounting and Auditing Trends
sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items). A minimum  Center for International Financial Analysis and Research
of three companies in each country were studied. The  companies represent a cross section of various 
industry groups; industrial companies represented 70 percent, and financial companies represented
the remaining 30 percent.”  La Porta et al. (1998). 
Newspaper circulation/pop Circulation of daily newspapers/population Dyck and Zingales (2004) from UNESCO Statistical yearbook 1996
Tax compliance “Assessment of the level of tax compliance. Scale from 0 to 6 where higher scores indicate  Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
higher compliance. Data is for 1995.” La Porta et al. 1999.
Competition laws Response to survey question, "competition laws prevent unfair competition in your country" Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
Higher scores suggest agreement that competition laws are effective.
Low Homogeneity Dummy equal to one if the homogeneity index is below the  average (correlation between  Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
stock returns of US firms within an industry at 2 digit SIC), computed as in Parrino (1997) 
for the period 1980-2003
High initial profitability Dummy equal to one if net income to sales at the beginning of the sample is above the  Authors' calculations based on firms in sample (Worldscope)
median of all firms in the sample.
High industry concentration Dummy equal to one if the firm is in a sector where the Herfindahl index computed US Census of Manufactures 1992
on US firms is above the average
Small size Dummy equal to one if the firm's average log of sales is below the sample average. Authors' calculations based on firms in sample (Worldscope)
Low asset intensity Dummy equal to one if the firm's average sales over assets is below the sample average. Authors' calculations based on firms in sample (Worldscope)
High market to book Dummy equal to one if the firm's market value plus total liabilities divided by the book value  Authors' calculations based on firms in sample (Worldscope)
is above the sample average.
Low leverage Dummy equal to one if the firm's leverage (total liabilities to assets)  Authors' calculations based on firms in sample (Worldscope)










TABLE II. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Column I contains the total number of firms we identified with dual-class shares and price information from Datastream and Compustat Global. Column II presents 
the estimated voting premium (as defined in equation 1) in that sample. Column III shows the average voting premium by country estimated by Doidge (2004). 
Column IV shows the number of firms in the sample for which there import penetration information is available, and column V the corresponding voting premium. 
Column VI shows the country averages of import penetration, which is the ratio of the value of imports relative to the value of imports plus the value of local 
production at the 3-digit industry by country and year. Column VII shows country averages of industry-adjusted import penetration, i.e. import penetration less the 
average import penetration for the relevant 3-digit industry. Column VIII shows the country averages of Product Market Regulation, an OECD index that measures 
the degree to which governments promote or inhibit competition at the country-level, available for 1998 and 2003 and ranging from 1 to 6. Column VII shows the 
Rule of Law index per country as defined in Table 1. The second panel reports the correlation between the different variables in the sample. 
 
Number of Estimated Voting Number of Estimated Import Industry-Adjusted Product Rule
Country Firms with Voting Premium Firms in Voting Penetration Import Penetration Market of 
Dual share data Premium Doidge (2004) Sample Premium Regulation Law
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Australia 4 0.216 0.155 4 0.154 0.151 -0.021 1.129 10
Austria 14 0.408 0.366 14 0.338 0.270 0.060 1.660 10
Brazil 167 0.160 0.253 11 -0.036 0.683 0.530 . 6.32
Canada 45 0.093 0.119 45 0.064 0.217 -0.012 1.298 10
Chile 6 0.084 0.085 . . . . . 7.02
Colombia 6 0.290 0.295 . . . . . 2.08
Denmark 33 0.155 0.088 32 0.261 0.228 0.031 1.300 10
Finland 19 0.241 0.072 19 0.323 0.153 -0.079 1.678 10
France 6 0.473 0.404 6 0.509 0.278 -0.056 2.100 8.98
Germany 67 0.201 0.155 67 0.181 0.190 -0.067 1.648 9.23
Italy 68 0.538 0.491 67 0.496 0.156 -0.136 2.366 8.33
Korea 128 0.512 0.670 128 0.753 0.166 -0.128 2.006 5.35
Mexico 18 0.149 0.008 16 0.299 0.313 0.010 2.303 5.35
Norway 15 0.120 0.042 15 0.395 0.124 -0.033 1.650 10
Peru 1 0.276 . . . . . . 2.5
Portugal 6 0.049 0.065 6 -0.046 0.126 -0.037 1.873 8.68
South Africa 16 0.043 0.076 2 -0.020 0.340 0.012 . 4.42
Sweden 59 0.067 0.045 59 0.061 0.221 -0.039 1.500 10
Switzerland 24 0.458 0.162 23 1.183 . . 2.059 10
Turkey 1 0.579 . 1 0.693 . . 3.100 5.18
United Kingdom 24 0.350 0.157 24 0.259 0.234 -0.011 1.009 8.57
United States 16 0.038 . 15 0.054 0.159 -0.138 1.300 10
Venezuela 6 0.221 0.134 . . . . . 6.37
Correlation with Column (II) 0.820 0.796
Correlation with Column (V) -0.323 -0.415 0.567 -0.049  31
TABLE III.A. PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL BY ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION 
 
The measure of PBC used is the voting premium between shares of differential voting rights as defined in equation (1).  The average is computed for different 
group of firms according to the level of competition, measured as import penetration (A,B), industry-adjusted import penetration (C,D) or the index of Product 
Market Regulation (E,F). Import penetration is the ratio of the value of imports relative to the value of imports plus the value of local production at the 3-digit 
industry by country and year. Industry-adjusted import penetration is import penetration by country, sector and year less the average import penetration for the 
relevant 3-digit industry. Product market regulation is an OECD index (from 1 to 6) of the degree to which governments promote competition by country, 
available for 1998 and 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by industry-country (rows A to D) and by country (rows E and F). The number of 
observations for each sub-sample is reported in square brackets. 
 
Mann
Measures of competition All 0 1 Difference Whitney
|z|
A =1 Firms in a top 50 percent import penetration, 0 otherwise 0.3659 *** 0.394 *** 0.338 *** -0.056 3.636 ***
Level of import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.038) (0.053) (0.055) (0.076)
[3011] [1506] [1505]
B =1 Firms in a top quartile import penetration, 0 otherwise 0.403 *** 0.255 *** -0.148 ** 7.201 ***
Level of import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.045) (0.058) (0.069)
[2258] [753]
C =1 Firms in a top 50 percent import penetration, 0 otherwise 0.454 *** 0.278 *** -0.176 ** 10.315 ***
Industry-adjusted import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.051) (0.053) (0.073)
[1506] [1505]
D =1 Firms in a top quartile import penetration, 0 otherwise 0.435 *** 0.158 *** -0.277 *** 9.945 ***
Industry-adjusted import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.045) (0.038) (0.052)
[2259] [752]
E =1 Firms in the top 50 percent by product market regulation 0.4358 ** 0.215 *** 0.658 ** 0.443 * 7.168 ***
0 otherwise, based on firms in sample (0.164) (0.059) (0.289) (0.247)
[984] [494] [490]
F =1 Firms in the top quartile by product market regulation 0.218 *** 1.099 ** 0.881 ** 11.791 ***





* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   32
TABLE III.B. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION 
 
The dependent variable in rows A and B is the import penetration ratio, defined as the value of imports relative to the value of imports plus 
the value of local production at the 3-digit industry by country and year. In rows C and D it is the industry-adjusted import penetration 
defined as import penetration by sector, country and year less the average import penetration for the relevant 3-digit industry. In rows E and F 
it is the OECD index (from 1 to 6) of product market regulation, which measures the degree to which governments promote or inhibit 
competition at the country-level, available for 1998 and 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by industry-country (rows A to D) 
and by country (rows E and F). The number of observations for each sub-sample is reported in square brackets. 
 
Measures of competition All 0 1 Difference
A =1 Firms in a top 50 percent import penetration, 0 otherwise 0.199 *** 0.0843 *** 0.3137 *** 0.229 ***
Level of import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.012) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017)
[3011] [1506] [1505]
B =1 Firms in a top quartile import penetration, 0 otherwise 0.1301 *** 0.4055 *** 0.275 ***
Level of import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.008) (0.024) (0.026)
[2258] [753]
C =1 Firms in a top 50 percent import penetration, 0 otherwise -0.059 *** -0.1562 *** 0.0383 *** 0.195 ***
Industry-adjusted import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019)
[3011] [1506] [1505]
D =1 Firms in a top quartile import penetration, 0 otherwise -0.1104 *** 0.0956 *** 0.206 ***
Industry-adjusted import penetration, based on firms in sample (0.008) (0.030) (0.031)
[2259] [752]
E =1 Firms in the top 50 percent by product market regulation 1.759 *** 2.193 *** 1.330 *** -0.863 ***
0 otherwise, based on firms in sample (0.122) (0.113) (0.057) (0.090)
[984] [490] [494]
F =1 Firms in the top quartile by product market regulation 1.509 *** 2.525 *** 1.016 ***





* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   33
TABLE IV. INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL 
 
The dependent variable is the voting premium between shares of differential voting rights as defined in equation (1). 
Industry-adjusted import penetration (IAIP) is import penetration less the average import penetration for the relevant 3-digit 
industry, where import penetration is the ratio of the value of imports relative to the total value of imports plus the value of 
local production at the 3-digit industry by country, sector and year. Product market regulation (PMR) is an OECD index 
that measures the degree to which governments promote or inhibit competition at the country-level, available for 1998 and 
2003, ranging from 1 to 6 and where higher values indicate more regulation. The description of rule of law, anti-directors 
rights, accounting standards, news paper circulation/pop, tax compliance, competition laws are provided in Table I. Above-
average rule of law is an indicator variable equal to one for observations with above average rule of law with respect to the 
sample. Columns I to IV (V) report all firms with information on IAIP (PMR)., where available. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, clustered by industry-country (columns I to IV) and by country (column V). 
 
I II III IV V
Industry-adjusted -0.7307 *** -0.6933 *** -0.9815 *** -1.1245 ***
import penetration (IAIP) (0.1916) (0.1623) (0.2162) (0.1996)
Product market regulation 0.632 *
(0.3580)








Tax compliance -0.1308 * -0.1305 **
(0.0764) (0.0567)
Competition laws -0.2832 ***
(0.1057)
Above average rule of law -0.4201 ***
(0.1022)
Above average rule of law * IAIP 0.6574 *
(0.3696)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3011 3011 3011 3011 984
R-squared 0.05 0.279 0.264 0.281 0.35
Dependent variable: voting premium
 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE V. INDUSTRY AND FIRM DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL 
 
The dependent variable is the voting premium between shares of differential voting rights as defined in equation (1). Industry-adjusted import penetration (IAIP) is import 
penetration less the average import penetration for the relevant 3-digit industry, where import penetration is the ratio of the value of imports relative to the value of imports plus the 
value of local production by 3-digit industry, country and year. Product market regulation (PMR) is an OECD index that measures the degree to which governments promote or 
inhibit competition at the country-level, available for 1998 and 2003, ranging from 1 to 6 and where higher values indicate more regulation. The description of low homogeneity, 
high industry concentration and high initial profitability are provided in Table I. Ln of assets is the natural logarithm of firm sales in U.S. dollars and net income to assets is the ratio 
of net income to assets from Worldscope, where available. Columns I to VI (VII) report all firms with information on IAIP (PMR), where available. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, clustered by industry-country (columns I to VI) and by country (VI). 
 
I II III IV V VI VII
Industry-adjusted -1.3564 * -4.8726 *** -2.4121 ** 0.5704 -4.2472 *** -2.0552 *
import penetration (IAIP) (0.7925) (0.8673) (0.9612) (1.0191) (1.5420) (1.1942)
Product market regulation 1.5309 **
(0.7408)
High initial profitability * IAIP 4.7655 *** 3.1658 **
(1.1732) (1.2611)
Low homogeneity * IAIP 2.5307 * 3.2015 ** 3.6818 ***
(1.4889) (1.3443) (1.3721)
High industry concentration * IAIP -3.0288 ** -1.0846
(1.3836) (1.4435)
Ln assets 0.0390 **
(0.0164)
Net income to assets -0.3856 ***
(0.1476)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3011 2788 3011 2443 2266 1734 984
R-squared 0.604 0.61 0.606 0.545 0.544 0.833 0.799
Dependent variable: voting premium
 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   35
TABLE VI. FIRM-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL 
 
The dependent variable is the voting premium between shares of differential voting rights as defined in equation (1). Industry-
adjusted import penetration (IAIP) is import penetration less the average import penetration for the relevant 3-digit industry, 
where import penetration is the ratio of the value of imports relative to the value of imports plus the value of local production 
by 3-digit industry, country and year. The description of low homogeneity is provided in Table I. High or low are indicator 
variables for a given firm’s position (sample average) relative to the sample for each of the following variables: size (log of 
sales), asset intensity (sales over assets), market to book (market value of equity plus total liabilities over the book value of 
assets), leverage (total liabilities to assets). Non-manufacturing is an indicator variable equal to one if the relevant firm is an 
industry outside manufacturing. Firm level information is from Worldscope, where available. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, clustered by industry-country. 
 
I II III IV V
Industry-adjusted -2.8406 *** -3.088 *** -2.8951 *** -2.4053 ** -3.005 ***
import penetration (IAIP) (1.0198) (1.0519) (1.0569) (0.9484) (1.0766)
Low homogeneity * IAIP 2.6141 * 2.2982 4.1767 *** 2.5297 * 3.0893 **
(1.4356) (1.4901) (1.4007) (1.4873) (1.5513)
Small size * IAIP 0.8617
(1.0798)
Low asset intensity * IAIP 1.1686
(1.0975)
High market to book * IAIP 0.2383
(1.4507)
High leverage * IAIP -0.0089
(0.1637)
Non-manufacturing * IAIP 2.7226 **
(1.1344)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3011 3011 3011 3011 3011
R-squared 0.606 0.606 0.609 0.606 0.607
Dependent variable: voting premium
 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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TABLE VII. PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL AND IMPORT PENETRATION (IV) 
 
The dependent variable is the voting premium between shares of differential voting rights as defined in equation (1). The Industry-adjusted import penetration (IAIP) is import 
penetration by country, sector and year less the average import penetration for the relevant 3-digit industry, where import penetration is the ratio of the value of imports relative to 
the value of imports plus the value of local production by 3-digit industry, country and year. IAIP is instrumented with the effective exchange rate and terms of trade variables. The 
results of the first stage are presented in the second panel of the table and the first panel shows the instrumental variable estimates of the effect of IAIP on the voting premium. Real 
effective exchange is the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator 
or index of costs from the World Development Indicators. Terms of trade are the weighted average of a nation's export prices relative to its import prices from the World 
Development Indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country (I, II, III and VI). Columns III, V and VI restrict the sample to the manufacturing sector. 
 
I II III IV V VI
Second Stage All All Manufacturing All Manufacturing Manufacturing
Only Only Only
Industry-adjusted -7.6433 ** -5.7568 * -10.9868 ** -26.4637 *** -16.8938 *** -16.8938* *
import penetration (IAIP) [2.5180] [2.6957] [4.7319] [8.3073] [4.1126] [8.0923]
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls No Yes Yes - - -
Country controls No No Yes - - -
Firm controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2726 2726 2338 2726 2338 2338
First stage
Effective exchange rate 0.00089 *** 0.00084 *** 0.00012 0.00019 *** 0.0002 ** 0.0002 **
[0.00020] [0.00016] [0.00020] [0.00007] [0.00008] [0.00008]
Terms of trade 0.0014 *** 0.00174 *** 0.00072 *** 0.00013 0.00042 *** 0.00042 ***
[0.00023] [0.00018] [0.00027] [0.00008] [0.00011] [0.00011]
Dependent variable: voting premium
 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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FIGURE I. VOTING PREMIUMS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION (PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION) 
 
Voting premiums are calculated using shares with differential voting rights as defined in equation (1). Product market regulation (PMR) is an OECD index that 
measures the degree to which governments promote or inhibit competition at the country-level, available for 1998 and 2003, ranging from 1 to 6 and where 
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FIGURE II. VOTING PREMIUMS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION (IMPORT PENETRATION) 
 
Voting premiums are calculated using shares with differential voting rights as defined in equation (1). Industry-adjusted import penetration (IAIP) is import penetration less the 
average import penetration for the relevant 3-digit industry, where import penetration is the ratio of the value of imports relative to the value of imports plus the value of local 
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